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Doni Gewirtzman
Vulnerability in American Constitutionalism
My paper argues that the Constitution - in both theoretical and practical ways prevents meaningful public engagement with human vulnerability, and will prove to be a
weak and unstable tool to establish collective responsibility for many forms of
dependency. This is true for 3 reasons:
*

A longstanding bias against emotional influences on constitutional interpretation
and public decision-making;

*

Structural and substantive elements of constitutional law that impair the state's
ability to act on behalf of vulnerable populations and the scope of constitutional
remedies available to those populations; and

*

The use of "vulnerability" in the "war on terror" places vulnerability in
conceptual tension with the core purpose of constitutionalism: to establish shared
commitments on the appropriate use of governmental power that transcend time
and circumstance.

Our FoundingFeelings. Emotions are central to public discourse about human
vulnerability. Any sustained effort to challenge current paradigms about public
responsibility and autonomy requires an ability to see vulnerability in our midst
(attention) and the sense of moral responsibility to affinnatively address it (appraisal).
New research in social psychology and neurobiology confirms that both elements contain
a necessary emotional component: First, social emotions like empathy draw attention to
human suffering and enable "perceptive taking" - the ability to see the world through
another's eyes. Second, our ability to take moral responsibility for another's welfare is
deeply influenced by emotional predispositions and framing that align the instinct to help
others with our own goals.
Yet, constitutional culture acts as an obstacle to any systemic effort to engage
vulnerability by marginalizing emotion's role in public policy and doctrinal development.
Since the Founding, emotions have been treated as a destructive force in constitutional
law. The desire to limit emotion's influence on decision-making was a core motivation
for central elements of our constitutional design. Moreover, the bias against emotion has
been reinforced by generations of constitutional scholars, legal pedagogy, and a
constitutional culture that positions rationalistic judges as the sole and final arbiters of
what the Constitution means. The result is a constitutional culture that is often incapable
of recognizing or accessing the emotional context necessary to address vulnerability and
dependency through a lens of collective responsibility.
Our Invulnerable Constitution. Beyond a liberty-oriented approach to social
relationships that reinforces the "autonomy myth"' and a constrained notion of equality
that constrains public interventions to "interrupt patterns of domination, subordination,
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and inequality,"2 core precepts of constitutional law severely constrain our ability to
address the needs of vulnerable populations in a meaningful way. Specifically, the
Constitution's failure to recognize positive rights, structural constraints that make the
likelihood of large-scale federal action on behalf of diffuse vulnerable populations
unlikely, 3 a state action doctrine that renders the Constitution impotent against individual
vulnerability to private power, and a restrained notion of constitutional citizenship all
prevent both the courts and the political branches from using public law as a tool to
address vulnerability. These constraints - most of which transcend ideological shifts in
the Court's membership - are real obstacles that severely limit both the Constitution's
and the federal government's ability to challenge prevailing notions about autonomy and
dependency.
The VulnerabilityParadox.On a theoretical level, vulnerability and
constitutionalism have a fraught and ambivalent relationship that makes it difficult to
reconcile the two concepts. While certain types of vulnerability - particularly the threat
of coercive governmental power - are often invoked to justify structural and substantive
constitutional constraints on the state's ability to act, other types of vulnerability are often
invoked to justify exceptions to constitutional rules. This places vulnerability in tension
with a core purpose of constitutionalism: to establish social precommitments that
transcend time and circumstance.
Throughout our history, assertions that national vulnerability justifies extraconstitutional actions in the name of necessity have inevitably accompanied conduct that
operates at the margins of constitutional and international norms. This includes Lincoln's
suspension of habeus corpus during the Civil War, the internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II, and the current Administration's expansive vision of Article II
presidential power in the "war on terror." This makes the theoretical relationship
between vulnerability and constitutionalism extremely unstable - particularly during
periods of war or emergency.
In conclusion, any constitution-based approach to vulnerability confronts at least
three serious obstacles that reach beyond judge-made doctrine: the anti-emotion bias,
core components of constitutional structure, and the theoretical tension between
vulnerability and constitutionalism. In turn, these constitutional realities suggest that
other legal avenues - such as state constitutions or international human rights norms may provide more promising avenues for reform.
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